This paper introduces a new logic-based technique for detecting security protocol weaknesses that are exploitable by freshness and interleaving session attacks. This technique is realised as a special purpose logic to be used throughout the protocol design stage, where a draft of the protocol is subjected to formal analysis prior to its publication or deployment. For any detected failures the analysis also reveals their cause, facilitating design corrections. The proposed Attack Detection Logic is introduced and its details, including the language, predicates, axioms, rules, semantics as well as soundness and completeness are presented. The effectiveness of the logic is evaluated in a case study, where it is demonstrated how to use the Attack Detection Logic as part of the design process of security protocols. Further, the logic is applied to a range of security protocols, including protocols with known weaknesses and protocols that are known to be secure. The logic's ability to detect various attacks is established by demonstrating that for protocols with known weaknesses, at least one detection rule is activated and no detection rule is activated for protocols without weaknesses. This case study confirms the logic's ability to detect design weaknesses exploitable by freshness and interleaving session attacks.
INTRODUCTION
D ESIGNING security protocols that are impervious to attack techniques, such as freshness and interleaving session attacks, has been shown to be extremely difficult [1] . This is also evidenced by the large number of published protocols that are found to contain various flaws -often several years after the original publication [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] . This difficulty continues today as highlighted by protocol attacks revealed over the last decade by many researchers, including the authors of this work, across a wide spectrum of security protocols:
Attack on nonce-based user authentication scheme using smart cards detected by Nam et al. in 2007 [6] . Attack on fingerprint-based authentication scheme detected by Xu et al. in 2008 [7] . Attack on key management protocol for wireless sensor networks detected by Dojen et al. in 2008 [8] . Attack on key distribution protocol detected by Dojen et al. in 2008 [9] .
Attack on remote user authentication scheme detected by Hsiang and Shih in 2009 [10] . Attack on end-to-end authentication and secrecy protocol detected by Dojen et al. in 2009 [11] . Attack on a satellite communications protocol detected by Lasc et al. in 2011 [12] . Attack on authentication/key distribution protocol for wireless networks detected by Lv et al. in 2012 [13] . Attack on ID-based scheme for mobile environment detected by Wang and Ma in 2013 [14] . Attack on lightweight RFID authentication protocol detected by Fu and Guo in 2013 [15] . Attack on RAPP ultra-lightweight RFID protocol detected by Zhuang et al. in 2013 [16] . Attack on user authentication scheme detected by Jurcut et al. in 2013 [17] . The primary difficulty in the development of effective security protocols is to address the vast possibilities of an adversary to gain information. In contrast to communications protocols, where the main issues are reachability of all legal states and avoidance of infinite loops, security protocol verification deals with the gain of information by an adversary [18] . The adversary can be either passive (just listening to communication) or active (modifying message content or order, dropping messages, etc). Active attacks incorporate freshness attacks and interleaving session attacks. In a freshness attack the adversary uses messages (or parts of messages) from previous runs of the protocol to gain an advantage. In an interleaving session attack, the adversary uses multiple runs of the protocol to gather knowledge. Interleaving session attacks incorporates many forms, such as identity attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, unknown key-share attacks, oracle attacks, multiplicity attacks and other parallel session attacks.
It has been shown that the use of informal methods is insufficient to ensure the correctness of security protocols [5] . A formal verification centred development process for security protocols that aims at revealing any potential exploitable weaknesses in the protocol design has been proposed by Coffey and Dojen [19] . This development process reduces the risk of using faulty protocols, as it improves confidence in the security of the designed protocol.
Original Contribution
In this paper we introduce a new formal technique for the detection of protocol design weaknesses at the design stage of security protocols. This technique reveals weaknesses that are exploitable by freshness attacks and interleaving session attacks, which incorporate many forms, such as impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, unknown key-share attacks, oracle attacks, multiplicity attacks and parallel session attacks. Thus, this technique can be used to subject a draft of a new protocol to formal analysis prior to its publication or deployment.
The main idea behind our attack detection technique is to characterize the general circumstances under which a potential attack may exist, by examining the protocol messages structure, and to define a logical formula that describes such circumstances. This technique is realised by way of a special purpose logic theory. This logic has the following key features:
Unique fault discovery capability: The logic consists of formulas that make statements about the properties of cryptographic transformations contained in each step of a message exchange, as well as the message properties and the knowledge of the principals involved. This approach allows reasoning about new properties, such as fresh component for recipient, freshness protected, principal value type equivalent, symmetries, strong sender/receiver bound, sender/receiver bound, of messages in security protocols. Reason for design weakness: In addition to detecting the presence of design weaknesses, this logic also identifies the reasons for the weaknesses. This information can then be used to eradicate the design weaknesses.
Paper Structure
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. Section 2 gives an overview of related work. The proposed Attack Detection Logic, incorporating: the language, predicates, axioms, detection rules, semantics as well as soundness and completeness of the logic are detailed in Section 3. In Section 4 we evaluate the effectiveness of the novel Attack Detection Logic in detecting protocol design flaws, including: (1) a detailed explanation on how to apply the detection logic, (2) a demonstration on using the logic as part of a security protocol design process and (3) a summary of attack detection results on a range of well-known security protocols. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
Design issues for robust and secure cryptographic protocols have been addressed by research studies over the past two decades. Bird et al. [20] introduced in 1993 a methodology to systematically build a family of cryptographic two-way authentication protocols that are resistant to a number of attacks. Carlsen [21] provided a list of information that should be attached to ciphertexts to protect protocol messages from being vulnerable to replay attacks. Gong and Syverson [22] presented the notion of fail-stop protocols over a restrictive class of protocol design rules that avoid replay attacks under certain conditions. Abadi and Needham [23] proposed a set of basic principles for strengthening the design of security protocols. Two major issues were addressed: i) the messages involved in a protocol together with their content and ii) the dependent trust relationship of the protocol participants. Anderson and Needham [24] extended this work by incorporating principles to avoid protocol design weaknesses, when using public and private key encryption. Aura [25] suggested recommendations to avoid replay attacks, which include: type-tagging messages with unique cryptographic functions and how to produce unique session keys without assuming mutual trust between the principals. Malladi et al. [26] also put forward a recommendation to avoid replay attacks by associating every protocol run with a session-id generated by all protocol participants. They reason that this guarantees replay attacks cannot be mounted, but they did not provide a mechanism on how participants agree on the session-id.
The work on designing new trustworthy security protocols continues to-date, as does the identification and elimination of design weaknesses in existing protocols [27] , [28] , [29] . Lasc et al. [30] identified desynchronisation attacks on a group of protocols that use dynamic shared secrets update mechanisms for wireless communications. The authors presented design guidelines to prevent such weaknesses and a formal system to model update mechanisms for shared secrets.
In 2014, Jurcut et al. [1] investigated the reasons why protocols are vulnerable to replay and parallel session attacks and developed design guidelines that ensure resistance to these attacks. This work proposed a set of protocol design guidelines that are general purpose so as to encompass a wide variety of protocols and to address the following protocol message exchange situations: 1) Guidelines to ensure message freshness, covering freshness requirements with and without synchronized clocks and transmission of components used in key generation. 2) Guidelines to prevent message symmetry, covering direct and indirect exchanges of cryptographic transformations. 3) Guidelines for signed messages. 4) Guidelines for handshakes construction, covering direct and indirect POSH, SOPH and SOSH types of challenge-response handshakes using symmetric and asymmetric encryption.
A NOVEL ATTACK DETECTION LOGIC
We now introduce a new logic-based technique for the detection of protocol weaknesses that are exploitable by freshness and interleaving session attacks. The set of security protocol design guidelines proposed by Jurcut et al. [1] forms the foundation for the formalised rules of the proposed attack detection technique.
Core Concept of the Logic
The basic concept behind this logic is to characterize the general circumstances under which a potential attack may exist by examining a large set of security protocols incorporating those found to be vulnerable to freshness and interleaving session attacks and also the published protocol fixes for the prevention of these attacks. This investigation analyses the (i) knowledge of the principals involved, (ii) role of messages in the protocol, (iii) way messages are transmitted and (iv) content of messages. On completing this analysis, a finite set of message exchange patterns is derived. For each of these patterns a new set of detection rules addressing problems leading to freshness and interleaving session attacks is proposed. Each rule defines logical formulae that describe circumstances under which an attack is possible. The logic consists of a language and sets of predicates, axioms, and rules.
Language
The language L of the logic introduces a set of syntactic rules for building well-formed formulas (wff).
Types of the Logic
Individual values, such as principals, cryptographic keys, nonces or arbitrary binary values form the atoms of L. The following atomic types are defined:
Principal: Participant of a protocol, denoted by capital letters (e.g., A, B, G, R) Trusted Third Party TTP: Sub-type of Principal. Entity trusted by all protocol participants. Cryptographic Key K: Key used for encryption/decryption. K GR denotes a Symmetric Key shared by G and R, K Gþ is a Public Key of G, K GÀ is a Private Key of G. Nonce N: Unpredictable random number. N G denotes a nonce generated by G. Timestamp TS: Identifying time when an event occurred. Function F(): Arbitrary function. Hash H(): Non-invertible cryptographic function. Binary Data dataXXX: Any other arbitrary data, not modelled by defined types. Valid data objects (also called components) are defined recursively as follows: Any atom ' is a valid data object. If b, c and d are valid data objects, then the following are also valid data objects: b,c (concatenation); d,(b,c) (expression order); {b}c (encryption); F(b) (function invocation) and H(b) (hashed expression) are also valid data objects.
Well-Formed Formulae of the Logic
A formula a is a wff of L if:
where PR is a predicate of L, x is a data object that satisfies the requirements of PR in arity and type, b and c are wff of L, and D and D 1 are sets of equal types.
Definitions and Considerations
The Attack Detection Logic is based on the following definitions and considerations related to protocols, time, cryptography and attacks against protocols.
Protocols
All message exchanges considered are intended to be between principals G, R and potentially a trusted third party TTP. It assumed that an intruder has full control over the communications environment, i.e., that the intruder can intercept, modify and replay messages or start new executions of the protocol. The intruder can be an outside agent or a dishonest legitimate principal of the system.
Definition 1.
A protocol P is a set of ordered steps fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . . :; Szg, z > ¼ 1, executed in any run of P. A protocol step S r is defined as: S r : G ! R : m, where G, R are principals and m is the message transmitted. G is the sender of message m of step S r and R is the recipient. In this paper sðS r Þ denotes the sender of step S r , rðS r Þ the recipient of S r and mðS r Þ the message of step S r .
Definition 2.
A message exchange of a protocol P is an ordered sequence of n steps of a protocol P (n ! 1 and n z, where z is the number of steps of P) and a message exchange of n steps of protocol P is denoted by E n ðP Þ: A message exchange E n ðP Þ can be depicted as in Fig. 1 .
An initiation step is any step in a message exchange/protocol, where any principal that is not a TTP is the sender. The set of all initiation steps is denoted ISðE n ðP ÞÞ for a message exchange and ISðP Þ for a protocol. Definition 5. A protocol run is a single execution of the ordered set of steps fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . . :; Szg of a protocol P. When multiple runs of a protocol are considered, the number of the run is indicated by an integer superscript, e.g., run m of protocol P is denoted P msimilarly, run m of a message exchange of protocol P is denoted E m n ðP Þ. A step S n of protocol run P m is denoted S m n .
Time
A timeline is defined as a set T of time indices t i structured by an ordering relation <, corresponding to the ordering relation of natural numbers N. The following assumptions are made about time:
Time is usually left-bounded to an initial value t 1 . Time can be right-bounded to any final value t n . In the definition of the logic, indices of steps indicate the time, i.e., steps fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S n g; n ! 1 correspond to the timeline T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n g. Further, t 0 indicates a time prior to the current protocol run. Similarly, superscripts of protocol runs indicate their timely ordering. Protocol runs can execute at different speeds: while P m starts before P mþ1 , protocol run P mþ1 may terminate before P m .
Cryptography
An ideal cryptographic environment is assumed, where ciphertext can only be decrypted with the right key -keys are initially only possessed by their legitimate owners.
Definition 6.
A cryptographic transformation c is either a cryptographic expression ({x}k) or a hashed expression (H(x)).
CT ðS n Þ denotes the set of all cryptographic transformations transmitted in a step S n and CT(P) the set of all cryptographic transformations of a protocol P.
Definition 7. A signed statement is a cryptographic expression
where the signing key is a private key.
Attacks Against Protocols
For the purpose of this Attack Detection Logic, we consider freshness attacks and interleaving session attacks, which incorporate many forms, such as identity attacks, man-inthe-middle attacks, unknown key-share attacks, oracle attacks and other parallel session attacks.
Definition 8. A freshness attack against protocol P is a protocol run P m where intruder I uses a cryptographic transformation c recorded from a previous protocol run P mÀi (that does not involve intruder I) in any step S m n and where the recipient of S m n is not able to detect that the cryptographic transformation c does not belong to protocol run P m . Definition 9. An interleaving session attack against protocol P is a protocol run P m where an intruder I establishes one or multiple concurrent protocol runs P n 1 ; . . . ; P n k and where I uses one or multiple cryptographic transformations c i from P n 1 ; . . . ; P n k in any steps S m n and where the recipients of the S m n are not able to detect that the cryptographic transformations c i do not belong to protocol run P m .
Predicates
The following predicates are defined within L:
C(x, y): object x contains object y. C(x, y, i): x contains object y as the ith subcomponent. P(G, x): principal G possesses object x. P(G, x, S r ): principal G possesses object x at step S r . K(G, a, S r Þ: G knows formula a is true at step S r . Res(S p , S o ): S p is a response step to initiation step S o . Gen(G, x, S r ): principal G generated x in step S r -x cannot appear prior to step S r . By convention, the generator is the sender of the step S r , in which x appears for the first time. Rint(G, x, S r ): G is the intended recipient of x in step S r . If x is a cryptographic expression, then this implies that G possesses the keys to decrypt x.
Symmetric(x,y): objects x and y are symmetric. Two components x, y are symmetric if both contain components of the same type (but not necessarily of the same value) that appear in the same order. Neither x nor y is a cryptographic expression. clear(x, S r ): object x is transmitted in cleartext in step S r . This also includes cases where x can be decrypted or derived from S r using known public key(s). onlyPriv(x, S r ): object x is transmitted in step S r only encrypted using private keys. If onlyPriv(x, S r ) is true, then any principal possessing the corresponding public key can retrieve component x from S r . KMaterial(x): x is key material, i.e., object x or some of its components are used in the generation of a key. replayðIðGÞ7 !R; x; S n r Þ: intruder I impersonating G can replay component x in step S r of P n to principal R, where x is recorded from a previous protocol run P m (with m < n). FAðE n ðP ÞÞ: a freshness attack (as outlined in Definition 8) can be mounted on the message exchange E n ðP Þ, that is the following holds: 9c 2 CT ðS mÀi n Þ : i > 0^:r ðS mÀi n Þ ¼ I^:s ðS mÀi n Þ ¼ I^r ðS m n Þ ¼ R^s ðS m n Þ ¼ G^replayðIðGÞ 7 ! R; c; S m n Þ ISAð E n ðP ÞÞ: an interleaving session attack (as outlined in Definition 9) can be mounted on the message exchange E n ðP Þ, that is the following holds: 9P n 1 ; . . . ; P n k ; P m :
Axioms of the Attack Detection Logic
The proposed Attack Detection Logic includes axioms ((A1) -(A21)) that facilitate reasoning about message characteristics in cryptographic protocols. These axioms combine predicates to define data component properties, such as fresh (A1) and shared secret (A3). Additionally, novel properties such as freshness protected (A4), principal value type equivalent (A7), strong sender/receiver bound ((A12)-(A14)) and traveling in opposite direction (A16) are introduced. The properties defined by the axioms are used by the detection rules of the logic to describe situations that can be exploited by attacks. Axioms (A18) -(A21) outline circumstances where components can be replayed, if they are not fresh, not receiver bound, not sender bound or if they are transmitted as cleartext.
ðA A1ÞFresh Freshðx xÞ: x is fresh if no one possessed x before the current protocol run. 
ðA A5ÞMk Mkðk k1; k k2Þ: k1 and k2 are matching keys if either:
k1, k2 are identical k1, k2 are both symmetric and shared with a TTP k1, k2 are different public keys k1, k2 are different private keys. x and y are principal value type equivalent, if for each subcomponent x i at position i of x that is of type principal there is a corresponding subcomponent y i of y that is also of type principal and either:
x i is a TTP and y i is a TTP x i and y i are generators of x and y, respectively x i and y i are not generators of x and y, respectively x i and y i are intended recipients of x and y, respectively x i and y i are not intended recipient of x and y, respectively 
ReceiverIdentifier if x is a component that identifies the intended recipient of a message.
{x}k is a sender-receiver component if it is encrypted with a symmetric key shared between the sender and recipient. Further, some component of x must be previously possessed by both principals.
ðA A12ÞSðG G; c cÞ: c is a strong sender bound cryptographic transformation of sender G if it is either: a cryptographic expression that contains at least one SenderIdentifier that identifies G a component encrypted with the private key of G. Hðy Ã Þ, where y Ã contains a shared secret and one or more SenderIdentifier that identify G. 
ðA A14ÞVðR R; c cÞ: c is a strong receiver bound cryptographic transformation of receiver R if it is either: a cryptographic expression that contains at least one ReceiverIdentifier that identifies R a component encrypted with the public key of R Hðy Ã Þ, where y Ã contains a shared secret and one or more ReceiverIdentifier that identify R.
ðA A15Þs sðR R; c cÞ: c is a receiver bound cryptographic transformation of receiver R if it is either: strong receiver bound cryptographic transformation sender-receiver component Hðy Ã Þ, where y Ã contains a shared secret and one or more sender-receiver components.
ðA A16Þ:"# ðc c1; c c2Þ: c1, c2 are traveling in opposite direction if they are exchanged between two principals as defined by A16a-d.
ðA A16a aÞ "# ðc c1; c c2Þ TOD TOD1 : Exchange c1, c2 directly.
ðA A16b bÞ "# ðc c1; c c2Þ TOD TOD2 : Exchange c1, c2 via TTP.
ðA A16c cÞ "# ðc c1; c c2Þ TOD TOD3 : TTP creates c2, but not c1. 
Rules of the Attack Detection Logic
The proposed Attack Detection Logic incorporates twentytwo detection rules. These are classified into four categories that address problems related to: message freshness, message symmetries, challenge-response handshake construction and signed messages. Each category comprises of rules, which detect weaknesses in the design of protocol message exchanges that can be exploited in freshness or interleaving session attacks. All rules have the form: prerequisites ! conclusion.
The objective of the logical analysis is to establish whether the prerequisites of any of the attack detection rules can be derived from the formalized protocol. If such a derivation exists, the analysed protocol is vulnerable to an attack (i.e., the rules of the Attack Detection Logic are sound, cf. Section 3.8). On the other hand, if no such derivation exists, the protocol is deemed secure against freshness and interleaving session attacks (i.e., the rules of the Attack Detection Logic are complete, cf. Section 3.9).
Freshness Rules
Freshness rules are based on the properties fresh component for recipient and freshness protected. The following weaknesses are detected by these rules:
None of the cryptographic expressions in a message exchange step contain a fresh component. None of the cryptographic expressions in a response step of a message exchange is freshness protected. Key material in a step of a message exchange is not sent at least once as a component of a freshness protected cryptographic expression. Consider rule (R1.1) Cryptographic expression lacking fresh component
If no cryptographic expression in a step S r contains a fresh component, then a freshness attack can be mounted on E n ðP Þ. This identifies a situation where a message can be replayed in a later protocol run. The fault can be eradicated by adding a component that is fresh for the recipient of S r . Remaining Freshness Rules (R1.2) Cryptographic expression of a response step not freshness protected
3) Non-freshness protected cryptographic expression containing key material 
If two principals exchange symmetric parent cryptographic transformations c1, c2 directly, which are principal value type equivalent pairs and are traveling in opposite directions, then an interleaving session attack can be can be mounted on E n ðP Þ. This rule identifies a situation where a cryptographic transformation c m can be used in a different position in a parallel protocol run. The fault can be eradicated by breaking the symmetry of c1 and c2.
Remaining Symmetry Rules (R2.2) Pair of symmetric & principal value type equivalent cryptographic transformations exchanged indirectly, as described by axiom (A16b) 
Assuming that G is the sender of step S r and R is the receiver of S r : If for all signed statements fxgK GÀ in S r that are contained in a parent cryptographic transformation fygK Rþ , such that all of the components c of y are not receiver bound, then an interleaving session attack can be mounted on E n (P). This rule identifies a situation where a signed statement fxgK GÀ intended for principal A can be sent to principal B, without B being able to detect that fxgK GÀ was intended for A. The fault can be eradicated by ensuring that all the components of y are receiver bound.
Remaining Signed Statements Rules (R3.2) Signed message within non-receiver bound parent cryptographic expression encrypted with a public key
Signed message within parent cryptographic expression encrypted with a symmetric key 
Handshake Rules
The attack detection rules in this category deal with different structures of nonce handshakes using symmetric or asymmetric keys:
POSH -Public Out Secret Home -the nonce is sent out in the clear and returns encrypted. SOPH -Secret Out Public Home -the nonce is sent out encrypted and returns in the clear. SOSH-Secret Out Secret Home -the nonce is sent out encrypted and returns encrypted. x G is freshly generated by G in step S o , x G is sent in clear at least once in S o .
Assuming that principals G and R share the symmetric key(s) k and that R is recipient of S o and sender of S p and that all {y}k in Y POSH are generated by R in step S p . Then an interleaving session attack can be mounted on E n ðP Þ; if S o and S p are free of any strong sender bound or strong receiver bound cryptographic transformations. This implies that the {y}k are neither strong sender bound nor strong receiver bound. This rule identifies situations where insufficient sender/receiver identification components are included in a POSH handshake. The fault can be eradicated by adding appropriate identification information.
All Handshake Rules are presented below by category. POSH Handshakes using symmetric encryption 
SOSH Handshakes using private keys
Let the sets Y SOSHo and Y SOSHp be defined for the same x G and same pair of steps S o and S p such that ResðS p ; S o Þ.
SOPH Handshakes using public keys
SOSH Handshakes using public keys
Let the sets Y SOSHoÀ and Y SOSHpÀ be defined for the same x G and same pair of steps S o and S p such that ResðS p ; S o Þ.
Semantics of Attack Detection Logic
The semantics for the Attack Detection Logic are based on Kripke's work [31] . This allows reasoning about the capabilities of a dishonest agent I at different runs of a protocol. In cases where dishonest agent I impersonates a specific principal G, it is denoted I(G). The proposed semantics use a multiple runs model, which is defined as a tuple M n ¼ (W,W 1 ; . . .,W n ; R 1 ; . . . ; R z ; I; D; d; d 1 ; . . . ; d n Þ. W is the non-empty set of all possible worlds (i.e., all possible protocol histories) to which the logic applies. W 1 ; . . .; W n are the subsets of possible worlds
to a run of the protocol. R 1 ; . . . ; R z are accessibility relations between all possible worlds from W. I is an interpretation function that assigns values to the components of the language. The set D is the domain of components of a protocol P for all worlds. The domain mapping function d specifies the components from D that are relevant to each world from W and the sub-domain mapping functions d i specify subsets of components from D which are relevant to each world W i . Further, the domain d i ðwÞ consists of all components of D that are relevant in world w 2 W i . The notation Iw represents the restriction of the interpretation function I to domain d(w), for w 2 W, while I i w represents the restriction of I w to domain d i ðwÞ, for w 2 W i .
A possible world is defined as a pair ðM n ; wÞ where M n is the multiple runs model, w 2 W describing a particular state of a world. If a formula a is true for such a world ðM n ; wÞ, then ðM n ; wÞ is said to satisfy a (written as ðM n ; wÞ a). Further, this semantics model allows individual or sets of possible worlds to be accessible at a step S r . In the Attack Detection Logic definition indices of steps indicate time i.e., steps fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S r g; r 1 correspond to the timeline T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t r g. Furthermore, the model M n enables describing the state of the system at a step S r belonging to run i of the protocol, denoted as S i r .
Semantics of Logical Connectives
Let G be the set of well-formed formulas of L. The satisfaction relation for a formula a 2 G is defined as: ðM n ; wÞ a iff I w ðaÞ ¼ true ðM n ; wÞ 2 a iff I w ðaÞ ¼ false
The semantics of the standard logical conjunction connective '^' and the unary negation connective ':' are defined as follows, where a; b 2 G: ðM n ; wÞ a^b iff ðM n ; wÞ a and ðM n ; wÞ b ðM n ; wÞ 2 a^b iff ðM n ; wÞ 2 a or ðM n ; wÞ 2 b ðM n ; wÞ :a iff ðM n ; wÞ 2 a It is possible to define the disjunction connective '_' using the semantics of '^' and ':'connectives, as follows: ðM n ; wÞ a _ b iff ðM n ; wÞ :ð:a^:bÞ ðM n ; wÞ 2 a _ b iff ðM n ; wÞ :a^:b
Further, considering the tautology a ! b :a _ b. Semantics for the material implication connective '!' are defined using that defined for '_' connective: ðM n ; wÞ a ! b iff ðM n ; wÞ :ða^:bÞ ðM n ; wÞ 2 a ! b iff ðM n ; wÞ a^:b
Finally, considering the tautology a $ b a ! b^b ! a. Semantics for the equivalence connective '$'are defined using that defined for '^' connective: ðM n ; wÞ a $ b iff ðM n ; wÞ a ! b and ðM n ; wÞ b ! a ðM n ; wÞ 2 a $ b iff ðM n ; wÞ 2 a ! b and ðM n ; wÞ 2 b ! a
Semantics of Predicates
The semantic interpretation of predicate C(x,y) is I(C) and is defined as the set of all pairs of objects ðx; yÞ 2 D such that x contains y. That is, ðx; yÞ 2IðCÞ holds if one of the following conditions holds: the sequence of bits of y and x are equal or the sequence of bits of y is a sub-sequence of x or there exists a sequence of bits of z which is equal to or is a sub-sequence of bits of x such that z is the result of the application of some cryptographic operations on y or on a sequence of bits of which y is a sub-sequence. The satisfaction relation for C(x,y) is defined as follows: ðM n ; wÞ Cðx; yÞ iff IðxÞ; IðyÞ 2 dðwÞ^Iðx; yÞ 2 IðCÞ ðM n ; wÞ 2 Cðx; yÞ iff IðxÞ; IðyÞ 2 dðwÞ^Iðx; yÞ = 2 IðCÞ
The predicate C(x, y, i) is similar to C(x, y). The interpretation of C(x, y, i) is I(C') and is defined as the set of all tuples ðx; y; iÞ 2 D such that x contains y as the i-th subcomponent. The satisfaction relation for C(x, y, i) has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for C(x, y)..
The interpretation of predicate ResðS p ; S o Þ is I(Res) and is defined as the set of all pairs of steps ðS p ; S o Þ 2 D such that S p is a response step to the initiation step S o . That is, ðS p ; S o Þ 2 IðResÞ is true if the following two conditions hold:
S o is an initiation step and therefore can be any step in the protocol, where any principal that is not a trusted third party (TTP) is the sender S p is the first step after S o , where the recipient of S p is the sender of S o . The satisfaction relation for ResðS p ; S o Þ has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for C(x, y).
The semantic interpretation of predicate RintðG; x; S r Þ is I(Rint) and is defined as the set of all tuples ðG; x; S r Þ 2 D where G is the intended recipient of x in step S r . That is, ðG; x; S r Þ 2 IðRintÞ holds if all the following conditions hold:
G is the recipient of step S r x is a sequence of bits of message sent in S r G can extract x from message S r The satisfaction relation for RintðG; x; S r Þ has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for C(x, y).
The interpretation of Symmetric(x, y) is I(Sym) and is defined as the set of all pairs of objects ðx; yÞ 2 D such that neither x and y are cryptographic expressions, but have both the same number of atomic data of the same type and appearing in the same order. The satisfaction relation for Symmetric(x, y) has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for C(x, y).
The interpretation of clearðx; S r Þ is I(Cl) and is defined as the set of all pairs of objects ðx; S r Þ 2 D where x is transmitted in cleartext in S r . That is, ðx; S r Þ 2 IðClÞ is true if one of the following conditions holds: the sequence of bits of x can be derived from S r without the application of any cryptographic operations the sequence of bits of x can be decrypted from step S r using public keys. The satisfaction relation for clearðx; S r Þ is defined analogous to the satisfaction relation for C(x, y).
The interpretation of predicate onlyPrivðx; S r Þ is I(oP) and is defined as the set of all pairs of objects ðx; S r Þ 2 D such that component x is transmitted in S r encrypted only with private keys. That is, ðx; S r Þ 2 IðoP Þ is true if there exists a sequence of bits y, where y is the result of cryptographic operations using private key(s) on x or on a sequence of bits of which x is a subsequence. The satisfaction relation for onlyPrivðx; S r Þ has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for C(x,y).
The interpretation of KMaterial(x) is I(KM) and is defined as the set of all objects x 2 D such that x contributes to the composition of the key. That is, x 2IðKMÞ holds if x or any subsequence of x is used in the generation of a new key. The satisfaction relation for KMaterial(x) has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for C(x, y).
The interpretation of P(G, x) is I(P) and is defined as the set of all pairs ðG; xÞ 2 D such that G possesses component x. The satisfaction relation is as follows: ðM n ; wÞ P ðG; xÞ iff IðG; xÞ 2 IðP Þ^IðGÞ; IðxÞ 2 dðw 0 Þ for all w' such that ðw; w 0 Þ 2 R i ðM n ; wÞ 2 P ðG; xÞ iff IðG; xÞ = 2 IðP Þ _ ðIðGÞ; IðxÞ 2 dðwÞ IðGÞ; IðxÞ = 2 dðw 0 ÞÞ for any w' such that ðw; w 0 Þ 2 R i .
The semantics of P ðG; x; S r Þ is similar to P(G, x). The interpretation of P ðG; x; S r Þ is I(P') and is defined as the set of all tuples ðG; x; S r Þ 2 D such that component x is possessed by G at step S r . The satisfaction relation has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for P(G, x).
The interpretation of KðG; a; S r Þ is I(K) and is defined as the set of all tuples ðG; a; S r Þ 2 D, where G knows that formula a is true at step S r . This implies that a is indeed true for all possible worlds. The satisfaction relation has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for P(G, x).
The interpretation of GenðG; x; S r Þ is I(Gen) and is defined as the set of all tuples ðG; x; S r Þ 2 D such that G generates component x in step S r . That is, ðG; x; S r Þ 2 IðGenÞ holds if G is the sender of step S r and x does not appear prior to S r in the protocol. The satisfaction relation has the same structure as the satisfaction relation for P ðG; xÞ.
The interpretation of replayðIðGÞ ! R; x; S i r Þ is I(Rep) and is defined as the set of all tuples ðIðGÞ ! R; x; S i r Þ such that intruder I(G) impersonating principal G records x in a step S h q of run h and replays x in step S i r of run i to R, where h < i. The satisfaction relation is given below: ðM n ; wÞ replayðIðGÞ ! R; x; S i r Þ iff ðM n ; wÞ P ðIðGÞ; xÞ for some h < i such that x 2 d h^I ðIðGÞ; R; x; S i r Þ 2 IðRepÞ^IðGÞ; IðRÞ; IðxÞ; IðS i r Þ 2 d i ðw 0 Þ for all w 0 such that ðw; w 0 Þ 2 R i ðM n ; wÞ 2 replayðIðGÞ ! R; x; S i r Þ iff ðM n ; wÞ 2 P ðIðGÞ; xÞ for any h i such that x 2 d h^I ðIðGÞ; R; x; S i r Þ = 2 I ðRepÞ _ ðIðGÞ; IðRÞ; IðxÞ; IðS i r Þ 2 d iðwÞ^I ðGÞ; IðRÞ; IðxÞ; IðS i r Þ = 2 d i ðw 0 Þ for any w 0 such that ðw; w 0 Þ 2 R i
The interpretation of FAðE n ðP ÞÞ is I(FA) and is defined as the set of all message exchanges of a protocol E n ðP Þ 2 D such that a freshness attack can be mounted on E n ðP Þ. That is, for any message exchange E n ðP Þ 2IðFAÞ a valid data transmission can be maliciously repeated by an attacker, who recorded the data from an earlier legitimate exchange. The satisfaction relation for FAðE n ðP ÞÞ is:
The interpretation of ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ is I(ISA) and is defined as the set of all message exchanges of a protocol E n ðP Þ 2 D such that an interleaving session attack can be mounted on E n ðP Þ. That is, for any message exchange E n ðP Þ 2 IðISAÞ, the interleaved execution of multiple protocol runs enables an intruder to use message components from one run to synthesize messages in other runs. The satisfaction relation for ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ is defined as:
Soundness of the Attack Detection Logic
Here the proof of soundness of the Attack Detection Logic is presented by showing that if a detection rule is activated (i.e., all prerequisites are satisfied), then a corresponding freshness or interleaving session attack can be mounted. In addition to the proof, the general structure of the corresponding detectable attack is provided. However, due to space limitations, we only provide details for two out of 22 rules, namely Freshness Rule R1.1 and Symmetry Rule R2.1.
Proving Soundness of Freshness Rule R1.1
Assume 9S a r 2 E a n ðP Þ such that sðS a r Þ ¼ G and rðS a r Þ ¼ R. If 8fxgk 2 S a r : :FreshðfxgkÞ then axiom A18 holds for each fxgk in step S a r and hence 8fxgk 2 S a r : replayðIðGÞ 7 ! R; fxgk; S b r Þ for any b > a: Thus, as all cryptographic expressions in step S a r can be replayed, the entire message S a r can be replayed in a subsequent protocol run S b r . Hence, FAðE n ðP ÞÞ holds.
The general structure of the attack is shown in Fig. 2 . In this attack, R has no way to establish that S 1 r belongs to E 1 n ðP Þ rather than E 2 n ðP Þ, as all the cryptographic expressions in S 1 r are not fresh.
Proving Soundness of Symmetry Rule R2.1
Assume 9S a q 2 E a n ðP Þ such that CðmðS a q Þ; c1Þ and CðmðS a r Þ; c2Þ. If "# ðc1; c2Þ TOD1 then it follows by axiom A16a GenðG; c1; S a q Þ^RintðR; c1; S a q Þ^GenðR; c2; S a r Þ^RintðG; c2; S a q Þ. If either Symmetricðc1; c2Þ (in case of hashed expressions) or SCEðc1; c2Þ (in case of cryptographic expressions) and Pvteðc1; c2Þ hold, then the format of c2 in step S a r is identical to the format of c1 in step S b q in a parallel run of message exchange E b n ðP Þ. Further, if c1 and c2 are both parent cryptographic expressions (Pðc1Þ^Pðc2Þ) then an intruder can substitute c2 of S a r as component c1 0 in S b r to impersonate principal R. Therefore, ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ holds.
The general structure of the attack is shown in Fig. 3 . An attacker can impersonate R in a parallel run, E 2 n ðP Þ, where the cryptographic transformation c2 obtained in step S 1 r is used as component c1 0 in S 2 q . As the parent cryptographic transformation required in S 2 q is symmetric and principal type value equivalent with c2 of step S 1 r , principal G cannot distinguish the replayed c2 in S 2 q sent by the intruder from a parent cryptographic transformation c1 0 sent by R in a genuine message exchange.
Completeness of the Attack Detection Logic
The presented Attack Detection Logic is complete with regard to the vulnerabilities in the set of analyzed security protocols as outlined in Section 3.1. Completeness is proven by demonstrating that if a detection rule is not activated, then the analyzed protocol does not contain the design weakness addressed by that detection rule. Due to space limitations, we only provide details for Freshness Rule R1.1 and Symmetry Rule R2.1.
Proving Completeness of Freshness Rule R1.1
Rule R1.1 addresses design flaws where a message contains cryptographic expressions without fresh components. This is a proof by contradiction: Assume 9S a r 2 E a n ðP Þ such that sðS a r Þ ¼ G and rðS a r Þ ¼ R. Further, assume at least one cryptographic expression fkgk in step S a r is fresh ð9fxgk 2 S a r : FreshðfxgkÞÞ. If Rule R1.1 is not complete, then FAðE n ðP ÞÞ holds. However, for FAðE n ðP ÞÞ to hold, it must be feasible to replay step S a r as S b r in a subsequent message exchange E b n ðP Þ with b > a. This is the case only if the recipient R of S b r is not able to detect that the replayed message belongs to exchange E a n ðP Þ. However, as FreshðfxgkÞ is true, the cryptographic expression fxgk is tied to message exchange E a n ðP Þ. Hence, principal R is able to detect that S a r belongs to E a n ðP Þ and not to E b n ðP Þ. This is a contradiction to the hypothesis FAðE n ðP ÞÞ. Thus, 9fxgk 2 S a r : FreshðfxgkÞ ! :FAðE n ðP ÞÞ and therefore rule R1.1 is complete. This is a proof by contradiction: Assume 9S q ; S r 2 E n ðP Þ with parent cryptographic transformations c1 2 S q and c2 2 S r . If R2.1 is not complete, then in the following cases ISAðE n ðP Þ holds: Case 1. :ðSymmetricðc1; c2Þ _ SCEðc1; c2ÞÞ. If c1, c2 are not symmetric, then the internal structure of both expressions is different and c1 cannot be used instead of c2. Thus, ISAðE n ðP Þ does not hold. Hence, :ðSymmetricðc1; c2Þ _ SCEðc1; c2ÞÞ ! :ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ. Case 2. :Pvteðc1; c2Þ. The appearance of principal components within c1 and c2 does not match. Analogous to Case 1, c1 cannot be used instead of c2. Thus, ISAðE n ðP Þ does not hold. Hence, :Pvteðc1; c2Þ ! :ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ. Case 3. : "# ðc1; c2Þ TOD1 . As c1, c2 are not exchanged between the same principals (in opposite direction), they contain identity information that will reveal the attempted use of c1 instead of c2 in a different run (cases where this information is not present are covered by other rules). Thus, ISAðE n ðP Þ does not hold. Hence, (: "# ðc1; c2Þ TOD1 ! :ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ. As all cases lead to :ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ, which is a contradiction to the hypothesis ISAðE n ðP ÞÞ, R2.1 is complete.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ATTACK DETECTION LOGIC IN DETECTING PROTOCOL DESIGN FLAWS
Here we present a study that evaluates the effectiveness of the presented Attack Detection Logic. Before the logic can be applied to a security protocol it is necessary to formalise the initial assumptions (statements defining what each principal possesses and knows at the beginning of a protocol run) and the protocol steps in the language of the logic. Then a process of deductive reasoning is used that applies the axioms and rules of the logic in an attempt to derive the conclusion FAðEnðP ÞÞ or ISAðEnðP ÞÞ. First, we demonstrate how the Attack Detection Logic can be used as part of the design process of a security protocol. Second, we present a summary analysis on a range of protocols. As the effectiveness of the logic can only be evaluated against security protocols where the expected outcome of applying the detection rules is already known, we apply the logic to protocols with known weaknesses and those that are known to be secure. The detection rules can be considered effective if:
Protocols with known weaknesses activate at least one detection rule, revealing that either a freshness attack or an interleaving session attack is possible. Protocols without weaknesses do not activate any detection rule.
Using the Attack Detection Logic in the Design Process of Security Protocols
In this section, we demonstrate how the Attack Detection Logic can be used in the design process of security protocols to ensure they are free of weaknesses that are exploitable by freshness or interleaving session attacks.
Specification of Initial Assumptions
Assume that a security protocol for smart-card based authentication is to be designed and that the Lee-Kim-Yoo Protocol (LKY) [32] is the current state of the protocol design. Then, the initial assumptions of the LKY protocol are specified as follows: A7: P(TTP,N TTP ,S 0 ) A8: K(TTP,Fresh(N TTP ),S 0 ) Statements A1-A4 define the initial assumptions for principal A before a protocol run (i.e., at time t 0 ). Assumption A1 states that A possesses symmetric key "H({A}datax)". A2 specifies that A is aware of the fact that TTP possesses "H({A}datax)". A3 specifies that A possesses the nonce Na and A4 states that A knows that nonce Na is fresh for the current run of the protocol. Statements A5-A8 define the initial assumptions of TTP's possessions and knowledge before the start of the protocol run. A5 states that TTP possesses key "H({A}datax)". A6 specifies that TTP is aware of the fact that principal A possesses "H({A}datax)". A7 expresses that TTP possesses the nonce Nttp and A8 states that TTP knows that Nttp is fresh for the current protocol run.
Specification of Protocol Steps
The steps of the LKY protocol are specified as: [6] . As weaknesses in the protocol design have been detected, it is necessary to amend the protocol as follows:
S1: A!TTP: A, {N
To eradicate W1, a component that A recognises as being fresh needs to be added to the cryptographic expression fN TTP gHðfAgdataxÞ in step S2. One option is to utilise the nonce N A and change the cryptographic expression to fN TTP ; N A gH ðfAgdatax). To eradicate W2, the symmetry between fN A gHðfAg datax) in step S1 and fN TTP gHðfAgdatax) in step S2 needs to be broken. The same solution as for W1 can be used, where fN TTP gHðfAgdatax) is changed to fN TTP ; N A gHðfAgdatax) To eradicate W3, the symmetry between HðfN A gH ðfAgdataxÞ; N A Þ in step S2 and HðfN TTP gHðfAg dataxÞ; N TTP Þ in step S3 needs to be broken. One option is to add nonce N A to change HðfN TTP gH ðfAgdataxÞ; N TTP Þ in step S3 to HðfN TTP ; N A gHðfAg dataxÞ; N TTP Þ.
After eradicating these weaknesses, the amended protocol is expressed in the language of the logic as follows: Applying the Attack Detection Logic to this protocol design establishes that no detection rules are activated. Therefore, no weaknesses are present that can be exploited by freshness or interleaving session attacks.
Applying the Attack Detection Logic to Security Protocols
Here we apply the Attack Detection Logic to a range of protocols-some with known weaknesses and some that are known to be secure. Due to space limitations, we only present specification of the protocol steps.
Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
The Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol [33] can be expressed in the language of the logic as follows: [2] and Coffey and Saidha [34] . As fNbgK Bþ in S7 is not sender bound, rule R4.7 is activated. This reveals the man-in-the-middle attack by Lowe [35] .
Station-to-Station Protocol
The MAC variant of the Station-to-Station Protocol [36] can be expressed in the language of the logic as follows: Applying the Attack Detection Logic reveals the following weaknesses:
As fK BDHþ ,K ADHþ gK BÀ from step 2 is symmetric in opposite direction to fK ADHþ; K BDHþ gK AÀ from step 3, rule R2.1 is activated. As fK BDHþ ,K ADHþ gK BÀ and fK ADHþ; K BDHþ gK AÀ are also not receiver bound, rule 3.1 is activated twice. This reveals the unknown-key-share attack by Blake-Wilson and Menezes [37] .
SSH Public Key Protocol
The SSH Public Key Protocol [38] can be expressed in the language of the logic as follows:
Applying the Attack Detection Logic reveals the following weakness:
As fH(A, N A , N B ÞgK AÀ in S5 is not receiver bound rule R3.3 is activated. This reveals the parallel session attack by Abadi [3] .
Abadi SSH Public Key Protocol
Abadi's amended SSH Public Key Protocol [3] can be expressed in the language of the logic as follows:
Applying the Attack Detection Logic establishes that no detection rules are activated. Therefore, no weaknesses are present that can be exploited by freshness or interleaving session attacks.
KJKW Protocol -Initial Phase
The Initial Phase of the Kim-Jo-Kim-Won Protocol [39] can be expressed in the language of the logic as follows:
LMLM Amended KJKW Protocol -Initial Phase
The Initial Phase of the LMLM amended KJKW Protocol [13] can be expressed in the logic as follows: Applying the Attack Detection Logic establishes that no detection rules are activated. Therefore, no weaknesses are present that can be exploited by freshness or interleaving session attacks.
Results for Other Security Protocols
In addition to the analyses detailed above, the detection logic has been applied to the following protocols: KZ Authentication Protocol [40] : Violates R2.2, R4.1, revealing parallel session attack [7] . Cluster Based Key Management (CBKM) Protocol [41] : Initial Clustering and Role Changing sub-protocol both activate R1.1, R1.2 revealing freshness attack [8] . Dojen et al. fix of CBKM Protocol [8] : No rules activated and therefore no attacks are detected. Yoon-Ryu-Yoo user authentication scheme [42] : Activates R2.1, revealing parallel session attack [10] . HCH Protocol [43] : Activates R2.1, revealing parallel session attack [14] . Nam, Kim, Park and Won fixed Lee, Kim and Yong Authentication Protocol [6] : Activates R1.2, R2.3, revealing replay attack [17] . JSXLC RFID Authentication Protocol [44] : Activates R1.1, revealing freshness attack [15] .
Summary of Effectiveness Study
The study shows that for all evaluated security protocols with known attacks at least one of the detection rules is activated. Thus, the logic is able to detect these design weaknesses in the chosen set of exploitable security protocols. Further, for protocols which are known to be secure, none of the detection rules are triggered.
A prototype tool implementing the proposed Attack Detection Logic is available at [45] , enabling the automated detection of weaknesses leading to freshness and interleaving session attacks, as well as the identification of the reasons for these weaknesses. This tool can be used to duplicate the results of this effectiveness study.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a new logic-based technique for detecting design weaknesses in security protocols that are exploitable by freshness and interleaving session attacks. This logic-based technique can be used at the design stage of a security protocol to establish the presence of such weaknesses.
If any design weaknesses are revealed, the technique also identifies the reasons for these weaknesses. This information can then be used to eradicate the design weaknesses.
The approach we have taken in the design of the Attack Detection Logic is to characterize the general circumstances under which potential attacks may exist and to define logical formulae that describe such possibilities. The logic analyses the security protocols by examining the structure of the exchanged cryptographic messages. Formulas that make statements about properties of cryptographic transformations, as well as properties of the message exchanges and the knowledge of the principals involved are derived and matched against the set of detection rules.
The components of the proposed Attack Detection Logic, including the language, predicates, axioms and rules, were presented. Semantics for the proposed logic were introduced and the soundness and completeness of the logic were demonstrated. The logic's ability to detect weaknesses exploitable by freshness and interleaving session attacks was demonstrated by applying it to an authentication protocol with known weaknesses. Further, the results of an evaluation study on the effectiveness of the proposed technique on a range of selected protocols revealed that: (i) For all the protocols evaluated those with known freshness or interleaving session attacks trigger at least one of the logic detection rules. (ii) Detection of all known design weaknesses exploitable by freshness and interleaving session attacks. (iii) None of the detection rules were triggered for protocols that are known to be secure against freshness and interleaving session attacks.
An automated implementation of the proposed detection logic is available at http://www.dcsl.ul.ie [45] . " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
